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WATCH COMMITTEE
of the
INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

Report of Indications of Soviet-Communist Intentions

No. 87

From: 27 March 1952
To : 2 April 1952
Washington 25, D.C.
3 April 1952

SUMMARY OF INDICATIONS DURING PERIOD

1. KOREA: Although there has been some increase in enemy forces near the front line, this apparently represents only preparations for routine rotation, and the enemy ground situation generally shows no change. Vehicle sightings indicate that substantial logistical support of Communist forces is continuing. There has been no significant change in the pattern of enemy air operations. A relatively low level of enemy jet sorties, the general lack of proficiency of Communist pilots and the considerable enemy losses continue to suggest that inexperienced units are currently committed over Korea. The Communist propaganda ~~campaign~~ campaign on biological warfare continues at a high level, but there have still been no Communist threats of retaliation or attempts to link the BW question with a Korean settlement. The ~~current~~ Communists are currently stressing the collection of "evidence" on US BW activity. Although various reports indicate the likelihood of epidemics in China, there is still no evidence of abnormal disease conditions in North Korea. In the cease-fire discussions, the Communists have given no indication that they are prepared to change their position on any major issue and their attitude suggests the continuation of stalling tactics.

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3. CHINA: ~~Available~~ Available evidence continues to indicate the possibility of a Communist attack on the Tachen Islands but there is still no firm evidence of an operational timetable. A strengthening of Communist defensive and air capabilities in Southeast China is indicated by reports of additional AA and coastal batteries in the Canton area and of the possible improvement of Whampoa Airfield near Canton. A Chinese Communist naval air arm is possibly being established with headquarters at Tsingtao. Reported major improvements of the airfield at Lanchou in North-Central China could indicate its employment for military as well as civil aviation purposes.

4. INDOCHINA: Viet Minh activity in the Tonkin Delta continues to decrease in intensity as the result of large-scale French clearing operations. Information concerning the present scale and nature of Chinese Communist aid to the Viet Minh continues to be relatively scant, but there are reports that aid will be further increased during 1952. There is no definite evidence of Chinese Communist preparations for imminent intervention.

there is still no evidence of the movement of CCAF units into the area adjacent to the Tonkin border. Recent rumors of French negotiations with the Viet Minh are wholly unconfirmed and there are no signs that the Viet Minh are immediately capable of seriously threatening the French military position.

5. SOVIET MILITARY ACTIVITY, GERMANY: Normal seasonal preparations for the movement of Soviet Army units into field training areas are continuing.

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No further information is available on the possible resumption of Soviet troop rotation between the USSR and Germany and Austria. Continuing progress in the jet light bomber conversion program of the 24th Air Army is indicated by the reported presence of increased numbers of Type 27 aircraft at Werneuchen Airfield.

6. SATELLITES: Construction at another Polish airfield indicates that Poland will eventually have a total of at least 25 major airfields. There are further indications that the construction of jet aircraft or components may be under way in Czechoslovakia. [redacted]

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[redacted] the possession by the Hungarian Air Force of jet fighters; the USSR is apparently equipping all the Satellite Air Forces (possibly excepting Albania) with at least one jet fighter regiment. Unconfirmed information states that rail improvements between northeast Hungary and the USSR are being accelerated and will be completed this year. Reports that Soviet broad-gauge rail lines are being extensively constructed in Eastern Europe are definitely incorrect.

7. USSR: The recent reply of Stalin to questions of American newspapermen was unusually cryptic and lacking in propaganda content and provided no clear indication of a new Soviet approach on basic issues of disagreement with the West. Coincident with the opening of the Moscow Economic ~~Sum~~ Conference there are some indications of increasing Soviet propaganda efforts to secure a revival of East-West trade. A recent Soviet press article on the construction and use of air raid shelters is the first known such reference in the Soviet press since the end of World War II.

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CONCLUSIONS

1. The lack of significant ~~ground~~ new ground or air developments in Korea and Communist tactics in the negotiations suggest a continued Communist willingness to prolong the stalemate. There is still no evidence that the intensive Communist propaganda campaign on the BW issue is designed primarily to ~~afford~~ affect the Korean negotiations.
2. There are no indications of Chinese Communist preparations for an early attack on Formosa. Available information ~~reflects~~ reveals no change in ~~Communist~~ Chinese Communist intentions in Indochina or Burma; despite a ~~continuing~~ continuing possibility of intervention, there are no definite indications that such action is imminent.
3. There are no indications of abnormal Soviet or Satellite military activities in Eastern Europe. ILLEGIB

Recent trends suggest Soviet plans for the ultimate development of Satellite air capabilities sufficient to permit independent military operations.
4. There are no indications that the USSR is preparing to make any major changes in its present international policies or to initiate hostilities with its own forces in the immediate forces.

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ANALYSIS OF INDICATIONS

1. Indications of Intentions in the Far East.

a. KOREA.

(1) Ground. The enemy ground situation shows no substantial change. The southeastward movement of the CCF 47th Army to the Suan area and the eastward movement of the CCF 67th Army to Hoeyang, now fully accepted, have increased the strength of enemy forces within operational distance of the front ~~ix~~ by 29,000. These moves still are considered to be preparations for routine rotation, and there is no evidence of enemy intentions to launch a general offensive in the immediate future. Acceptance of the entire CCF 31st Antitank Division in support of front line units represents a strength increase of 2,500. Enemy casualties during the week are estimated at 8,500, resulting in a net decrease in Communist strength of 6,000, to a total of 848,000. Vehicle sightings in enemy rear areas showed a daily average of 2,673 and a southbound average of 1,776. These are the highest averages in four weeks, and indicate no diminution of logistical support.

(2) Air. Enemy air operations during the week ending 31 March revealed no significant change in pattern; the relatively low total of 463 sorties observed was probably due, in part at least, to the poor weather which prevailed on four days during the period. Possibly another factor accounting for the low sortie rate is the apparent arrival of new, unseasoned enemy jet units in the southern Manchuria area, as indicated by the observation on 24 March of 235 MIG-15's of varying color on Antung and Tatungkou Airfields, and by the low ~~xxx~~ proficiency of most of the enemy jets encountered during the week. Although 385 enemy jets were observed on 1 April, of which 87 were engaged, the enemy's losses (ten destroyed, three probably destroyed and 12

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damaged) further illustrate the low proficiency of pilots currently committed.

Enemy night activity increased somewhat, although little change in technique was apparent. During the night of 24-25 March several possible enemy jet aircraft were observed near the 38th Parallel in western Korea, and antiaircraft encountered in the Sinanju area on the night of 28-29 March provided further evidence of coordination between radar-controlled searchlights and antiaircraft artillery.

(3) Political. There have ~~xxx~~ been few new developments in the Communist campaign concerning alleged US employment of ~~xxxx~~ biological warfare in North Korea and Communist China. Attention to this ~~xxxxxx~~ issue, particularly in the Soviet Union and Communist China, continues at a high level and is receiving the heaviest play of any propaganda campaign of the past two years. There have still been no Communist threats of retaliation, however, and there has been no attempt to link the question of a Korean settlement with the BW issue.

An announcement from Pyongyang that the North Korean Foreign Minister has sent his 22 February statement on BW to the UN marks the second official Communist protest ^{on this subject} to the UN. Statements of the various Communist "investigating teams" citing the ~~existing~~ "evidence" which they have uncovered of US employment of BW in Korea and Northeast China received the major emphasis during the week, and Pyongyang and Peiping also claimed that UN PW's had "confirmed" US use of BW. The Executive Committee of the World Peace Council at its meeting in Oslo (see Watch Committee Report No. 86) appointed a commission to review the evidence on BW and, as expected, it concluded that the US was employing BW. A preliminary communique of the WPC meeting announced that it had also discussed other issues, including Germany and Japan and the

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"independence of ~~nations~~ nations," so that the final action to be taken as the result of this meeting is not yet clear.

Although there is still no evidence of disease in epidemic proportions in North Korea, various reports now indicate the probability of outbreaks of bubonic plague in South Manchuria and the Canton area and other contagious diseases appear to be epidemic in Northeast China. According to one press report, Communist sources have admitted that large sections of ~~South~~ Southwest China are affected by

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epidemics of smallpox, meningitis and other diseases. In general, however, the Communists have claimed that anti-epidemic measures in both Korea and China are making great strides and have ~~prevented~~ prevented the outbreak of epidemics.

At Panmunjom, the Communists have given no indication that they are prepared to change their position on any major issue and their haggling over minor issues also suggests the continuation of stalling tactics. Although some agreement was reached in secret sessions on the PW question, there is no indication that the Communists are willing to accept the principle of voluntary repatriation. Despite the lack of progress, Communist propaganda continued to give attention to the talks and to contain a slightly ~~optimistic~~ optimistic note that a truce might be concluded. One Soviet broadcast, after charging the US with stalling and ~~making~~ attempts to extend the war in the Far East, ~~nevertheless~~ nevertheless asserted that "peace shall be established in Korea."

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
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c. CHINA. Available evidence concerning Chinese Communist activities along the Chekiang coast opposite the Tachen Islands ~~may~~ continues to indicate the possibility that preparations are being made for an attack. Although there is still no firm evidence of an operational timetable, one report has stated that the Chinese Communist Third Field Army is making preparations to launch an attack during June. Current press reports from Hong Kong concerning the training of paratroops in the Canton area for the alleged purpose of assuming a defensive role in the event of a Chinese Nationalist invasion of the mainland are viewed with reserve, although trained paratroopers in small numbers have been previously reported arriving in the Canton area from Hainan and then proceeding north.


Other ~~more~~ reported military activity in Southeast China continues to indicate a strengthening of defensive and air capabilities. Soviet-manufactured AA guns are reported to have been installed in various parts of Canton, and  indicates that ^{two} new battery positions, one of ~~which~~ them probably for guns of 150-mm., are under construction at an island in the Pearl River estuary above Hong Kong. Although available evidence continues to indicate no immediate military threat to Hong Kong, a gradual increase in CCF strength in the Canton area has taken place during the past several months. 

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information as of 1950 on Whampoa (Huang-pu) shows only one 5,000-foot runway.

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the completion of longer runways would make this installation suitable
as a major jet fighter base for defense of the Canton area, or as a light
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or medium bomber base for eventual ~~operations~~ operations against Formosa.

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[REDACTED] the ~~Exx~~ Communists have established a naval avia-
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tion school at Tsingtao, the principal naval and naval training center in
Communist China.

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[REDACTED] the development of a naval aviation
capability, probably for reconnaissance and security purposes, is a logical
sequel to the development of the embryonic Chinese Communist navy, which re-
portedly has been under way for the past two years.

25X1 [REDACTED] the airfield at Lanchou (Kansu
Province) which is the terminus of the Sino-Soviet civil airline route
through ~~Sinkiang Province~~ Sinkiang Province to the Soviet Union, has under-
gone major improvement, and that numerous Russian military ~~personnel~~ and air
personnel are in the city. Although little is known about military activities
at Lanchou, at least one previous report has indicated the existence of a
jet school at this location, possibly accounting for the presence of Russian
air personnel, while in early 1951 there were indications that large quanti-
ties of gasoline had been stored there. Although the utilization of Lanchou
as a major ~~xxx~~ civil air terminus is sufficient reason to warrant ~~major~~
substantial improvement, its location in the western portion of the Yellow
River basin also makes it available as an important part of the air defenses
of that area.

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d. INDOCHINA. Viet Minh activity in the Tonkin Delta continues to decrease in intensity as the result of large-scale French ~~xxx~~ clearing operations. One unconfirmed report indicates that major elements of the Viet Minh 316th Division have now moved outside the French perimeter, and five battalions of the 320th Division reportedly have been trapped east of Thai Binh. It is believed that the 320th Division is no longer capable of cohesive action. The formation of a new Viet Minh regiment, the 46th, is now accepted. This regiment, consisting of one regular and two regional battalions, is operating in the extreme southern part of the Delta.

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Information concerning the present scale and nature of Chinese Communist aid to the Viet Minh continues to be relatively scant. [REDACTED]

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Information on possible Chinese Communist preparations for intervention ~~has been~~ ^{has been} very meager. Press sources in Hong Kong continue to report the heavy movement of CCF "volunteer" units, including antiaircraft and tank units, ~~into~~ into Indochina, but these reports appear to be only rumors.

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could strike effectively at French Army, Navy and Air installations throughout the area. The French possess neither adequate air warning equipment, nor air units capable of effectively resisting a concentrated attack, and a surprise attack, continued over a 24-hour period, would neutralize the bulk of French aircraft in Tonkin. There is, however, no evidence of the movement of CCAF units ~~into~~ into the area adjacent to the Tonkin border or other indications that such an attack is imminent.

Several recent rumors that the French have undertaken secret negotiations with the Viet Minh with the alleged objective of seeking a settlement

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are not supported by any reliable evidence. ~~Subsequently~~ Contrary to some suggestions that a "deterioration" of the French military position in Tonkin is leading them to consider negotiations advisable, the present ~~at~~ military situation actually appears more favorable to the French than at any time during the past several months. Although the long-term outlook is less favorable, there are no immediate signs of a major ~~unforeseen~~ increase in Viet Minh capabilities which would seriously threaten the French position in the near future.

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2. Indications of Intentions in Europe.

a. SOVIET MILITARY ACTIVITY, GERMANY.

(1) Soviet Army. No new developments have been reported in Soviet training activities in Germany. There were no positive indications as of mid-March that major units had initiated the spring movement to field training areas, despite the probable presence of advance parties in all of the major Soviet training areas. By mid-March, however, elements of three of the nine ~~six~~ antiaircraft divisions in Germany reportedly were at the Wustrow AA training center on the Baltic coast.

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(2) Soviet Air Activity. Continuing progress in the jet light bomber conversion program of the 24th Air Army is indicated by the reported observation of 40 Type 27 aircraft on Werneuchen Airfield on 16 and 18 March, as compared to the observation of only 28 on 1 March. Although the twelve additional aircraft may have been transient from another light bomber base

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in East Germany, it is considered more likely that they represent further augmentation of the jet conversion program under way in the two Werneuchen-based bomber regiments.

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[redacted] the appearance on 21 March of two Pe-8 aircraft (obsolete four-engine bombers ~~in~~ similar in appearance to the USAF B-17) suggests a partial explanation [redacted] of the observation of four-engine aircraft at several East German airfields. The Pe-8, which is no longer considered an operational bomber, is occasionally used for transport and reconnaissance. The appearance of such aircraft in East Germany, if true, is considered of little significance.

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b. SATELLITES.

(1) Poland. Major construction recently reported at Poznan/Kreszeniny Airfield brings the total number of airfields in Poland under construction to eleven firm and seven probable, and indicates that Poland will eventually have a total of at least 25 ~~xxx~~ major airfields.

(2) Czechoslovakia. Additional indications of military production in Czechoslovakia, possibly ~~xxxx~~ involving jet aircraft or components, include a recent unconfirmed report that jet engines are being built and block tested at Jinonice (in the outskirts of Prague) and unrelated reports that underground projects under way in the Prague area are to house factories. Numerous previous reports have indicated plans to build jet aircraft or components in Czechoslovakia (see Watch Committee Reports Nos. 72 and 76). In late 1950, plans were reported for the manufacture of MIG-15 airframes and jet engines, while in October 1951 there were reports that ~~xxx~~ machine tooling for such production was almost complete.

(3) Hungary.

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by the Hungarian Air Force of jet fighters and brings to five the number of European Satellite Air Forces known to be partially jet-equipped. Observation of Tokol Airfield, Budapest, on 27 March revealed 22 MIG-15's bearing Hungarian Air Force markings either airborne or on the ground. These aircraft probably were transferred temporarily from the Hungarian base at Kunmadaras (80 miles east of Budapest) for the "Liberation Day" parade on 4 April. This observation brings to 135 the minimum total of jet fighters confirmed in Satellite Air Forces and strengthens the belief that the Soviets are equipping the Satellites (possibly excepting Albania) with at least one jet fighter regiment each. Although there is little evidence that these air forces have progressed beyond the basis training stage, the trends noted suggest the planned development of an air capability sufficient to permit ultimate Satellite military operations independent of active Soviet Air Force participation.

(4) Satellite Railways. A report has been received of plans to accelerate work on improvement of transportation facilities between Miskolc (in northeast Hungary) and the USSR. Allegedly, instructions have been issued to complete improvements to the rail facilities in this area ~~by the~~ during 1952. Although it is known that work is in progress on rail and highway communications in northeast Hungary, reliable details of the program or the planned completion date have not been received. A recent press report that Soviet broad-gauge lines have been constructed across Poland and through ~~East~~ eastern Rumania is definitely incorrect; the only known ~~xxx~~ broad-gauge line in Eastern Europe is a short stretch in northern Poland near the Soviet border. Frequent rumors that the USSR is preparing to extend broad-gauge lines into the Satellites are received and observations have suggested that the roadbed for such a line is being laid in northeast Hungary. There is no evidence, however, that preparations are being made for the widespread con-

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struction of Soviet-gauge lines in Eastern Europe, and such lines as were constructed by the USSR during World War II were all subsequently removed.

3. General Indications of Soviet Intentions.

a. **STALIN'S STATEMENT.** Premier Stalin's terse replies to four questions submitted by a group of American editors were unusually cryptic ~~and~~ and notable chiefly because of the relative infrequency of pronouncements by Stalin and the omission of any propaganda from ~~his~~ his replies in this instance. Possibly significant, in contrast to statements of Stalin during 1951 that war might "become inevitable" and that the US and the UK were preparing for an atomic attack on the USSR, was his statement that world war is no closer now than two or three years ago. His replies that a meeting of the heads of the great powers "possibly would be beneficial" and that the moment is opportune for the unification of Germany obviously add nothing to ~~previously~~ ^{previously} announced Soviet views. Stalin's reply to the question on the possibility of coexistence of capitalism and communism was somewhat unusual in its reference to the necessity for the observance of the "principle of equality and non-interference in the international affairs of other states." Although the principle of equality apparently refers to the veto right, what he ~~meant~~ meant by "non-interference" is not immediately clear. Some further light on the significance of this statement, if any, may be obtained from future amplification in the Soviet press.

b. **GENERAL.** Apart from the emphasis on the BW campaign, there is little of note in recent Soviet propaganda. A new ramification of the BW theme was the statement of Albanian Prime Minister Hoxha at the Congress of the Albanian Workers' Party that the US has dropped food in Albania contaminated with deadly germs. Soviet propaganda on the eve of the ~~convening~~ convening of the long-heralded Moscow Economic Conference has laid particularly heavy

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stress on the desirability and possibilities of British trade with Communist China, and there have been some recent suggestions that the USSR will make increased propaganda efforts to lure Western Europe with offers of a revival of East-West trade. Of interest, as it is the first known such article in the Soviet press since World War II, was a recent description in the organ of ~~REDACTED~~ DOSAAF (the Soviet paramilitary organization) concerning the construction and use of air raid shelters. The article gives no information as to the extent to which such shelters are being built or still exist since the war, but it is quite clear that members of DOSAAF and others who pass the norms for antiaircraft defense are being taught not only how to behave during air raids but how to build shelters.

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